

# **Fukushima Status and Lessons**

**LAS/ANS Symposium on Fukushima  
Outcomes: The impact on Latin American  
Nuclear Power Programs**

2 to 5 July 2012.

Rio de Janeiro – Brazil

Kazuaki Matsui/ IAE

# Unprecedented challenge for Japan

## The Great East Japan Earthquake

### Earthquakes

#### Main shock

- Magnitude : 9.0 (Mar. 11<sup>th</sup> 2011)

#### Aftershocks


- Magnitude 7 or greater : 6 times
- Magnitude 6 or greater : 97 times
- Magnitude 5 or greater : 594 times  
(As of Feb 28<sup>th</sup> 2012)

### Casualties

- Dead : over 15,800
- Missing: over 3,200
- Injured: over 6,000 (As of Feb 21<sup>st</sup> 2012)

### Evacuees

- Over 342,000 (As of Feb 9<sup>th</sup> 2012)




**Enormous earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident**



# The 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake on March 11, 2011: Fault Model By Geospatial Information Authority of Japan

## 1. Horizontal Displacement

From 2011/03/10 - 2011/03/10  
To 2011/03/12 - 2011/03/12  
固定局: 福江 (950462)  
Reference Site: 950462



5.3m

1.2m


星印は気象庁の震央 (142.861°, 38.104°).  
A Star indicates an epicenter released from JMA. (142.861°, 38.104°)  
矩形断層二枚での推定結果。  
Two rectangular faults with uniform slip are assumed.  
西側に傾き下がる逆断層。モーメントマグニチュードは北側が8.8、南側が8.3。2つ合わせて8.9。  
West-dipping reverse fault. Total moment magnitude: Mw8.9(Northern segment: Mw=8.8, Southern segment: Mw=8.3)  
断層の長さは南北に約190kmの断層1と約190kmの断層2で合計約380km。  
Total major rupture length: ~380 km (Fault Length: Northern segment ~190 km / Southern segment ~190 km)  
赤丸は気象庁一元化震源 (3/11-3/15)。  
Red circles indicate epicenters determined by JMA. (3/11-3/15)

緯度 Lat	経度 Lon	上端深さ Depth (Fault Top) km	長さ Length km	幅 Width km	走向 Strike	傾斜角 Dip	すべり角 Strike Slip Angle °	すべり量 Slip m	Mw	
断層1	38.80°	144.00°	5.1	186	129	203	16	101	24.7	8.8
断層2	37.33°	142.80°	17.0	194	88	203	15	83	6.1	8.3

Lat=38.80 Lon=144.00 D=5.1km L=186.129km Strike=203deg Dip=16deg Rake=101deg Slip=24.7m Open=0.0m Mw=8.8  
Lat=37.33 Lon=142.80 D=17.0km L=194.88km Strike=203deg Dip=15deg Rake=83deg Slip=6.1m Open=0.0m Mw=8.3

## 2. Vertical Displacement

From 2011/03/10 - 2011/03/10  
To 2011/03/12 - 2011/03/12  
固定局: 福江 (950462)  
Reference Site: 950462



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# Damages of Seawall and Harbor Installation



Destruction by tsunami scouring

Destruction by wave pressure



# Current Status of the Nuclear Power Plants in Japan


(as of May 28, 2012)

**■** : In operation  
(0 unit, 0GWe)

**■** : Outage for the periodic inspection and others  
(37 units, 32.97GWe)

**■** : Shutdown due to tsunami and the government request  
(13 units, 13.18 GWe)


TOTAL : 50 units, 46.15 GWe



# 1. Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident and Toward Decommissioning

## Overview of the Accident (2/2)

3



	Earthquake		Tsunami					Fuel Damage
	Power Supply (Off-Site Power/EDG)	Cooling Function	Tsunami Height (m)	NPP Altitude (m)	Power Supply		Cooling Function	
		SWP			Off-site Power	EDG	SWP	
<b>O: Outage</b>								
Onagawa 1,2,3	○ (○/○)	○	13	13.8	○	○	○	Intact
Fukushima Dai-ichi 1,2,3,4 5,6	○ (×/○)	○	15.5 (Submerged)	10 (Unit 1 to 4) 13 (Unit 5,6)	× (Tsunami)	<b>Unit 1 to 5</b> × Unit 6 ○	Unit 1 to 4 × Unit 5,6 ×→○ A few days later	Unit 1 to 3 (Damaged) Unit 4 to 6 (Intact)
Fukushima Dai-Ni 1,2,3,4	○ (○/○)	○	14.5 (Submerged)	12	○	Unit 1,2 × Unit 3,4 ○	Unit 1,2,4 ×→○ A few days later Unit 3 ○	Intact
Tokai Dai-ni 1	○ (×→○/○) A few days later	○	5.3	8	Earthquake ×→○ A few days later	○	○	Intact

FEPC

# ***Mid-to-Long-Term Decommissioning***

- Fukushima Daiichi #1 to #4 decommissioning is much more complicated than the case of TMI-2
- Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool is to start to be removed within 2,013, the next year
- Defueling from RPV is to start within 10 years.
- Defueling process may take over 20 to 25 years for completion
- Government supports with R&D have commenced for defueling and Fukushima Daiichi-Cleanup
- Flexible program management is must
- International supports and contribution to the activities would be appreciated.

# Mid-to-Long-Term Decommissioning Roadmap Outline

Mid-to-Long-Term Roadmap towards the Decommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4

Step 2  
Completion on  
Dec. 16, 2011

*Within 2  
Years*

*Within 10  
Years*

*After 30-40  
Years*

STEP 1, 2

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3


Period to the start of  
fuel removal from the  
spent fuel pools  
(Within 2 years)

Period to the start of  
fuel debris removal  
(Within 10 years)

Period to the end of  
decommissioning  
(After 30-40 years)

Actions towards systematic staff training and allocation, improving motivation, and securing worker safety will be continuously implemented

**Structural strength of #4 RB and SFP proved sufficient against another earthquake by analysis. In addition, 20% seismic safety margin increased by reinforcing the bottom of SFP**



Photos by courtesy of TEPCO, June 12, 2012



1F-#4



Top of SFP floor

1F-#4 operation floor




Look up SFP bottom




Check the concrete wall newly installed

# Toward Fuel Debris Removal



Water levels at the bottoms of PCV #1, 2, 3

- #1; ~2 m
- #2; ~50 cm
- #3; ~5 m



# ***3. Technological Knowledge about the Accident***

- 5 categories, 30 countermeasures (in the interim report on Feb. 16, 2012)

**External Power Supply Systems**

**On-site Power Supply Systems**

**Cooling Systems**

**Countermeasures for Containment Systems**

**Communication, Instrumentation and Control System,  
and Emergency Response Arrangement**

- The presentation at IAEA International Experts' Meeting held on March 19-20, 2012 in Vienna

# External Power Supply Systems (Reference)

- Countermeasure 1 Improve reliability of external power supply system and grid
- Countermeasure 2 Improve earthquake resistance of substation
- Countermeasure 3 Improve earthquake resistance of switchyard
- Countermeasure 4 Recover external power supply quickly

# On-site Power Supply Systems (Reference)

- Countermeasure 5 Disperse On-site power equipment
- Countermeasure 6 Enhance countermeasure for flooding
- Countermeasure 7 Enhance diversity and redundancy of emergency AC power supply
- Countermeasure 8 Enhance emergency DC power supply
- Countermeasure 9 Prepare dedicated backup power supply
- Countermeasure 10 Facilitate alternative power supply from outside
- Countermeasure 11 Stock backup electrical equipment

# Cooling Systems (Reference)

- Countermeasure 12 Improve the response capabilities for accidents
- Countermeasure 13 Disperse the cooling water system and prevent flooding
- Countermeasure 14 Enhance UHS at a time of accident
- Countermeasure 15 Improve the maneuverability of isolation valves
- Countermeasure 16 Enhance the alternative water injection functions
- Countermeasure 17 Improve the reliability of cooling and injection system for spent fuel pool


# Containment Systems (Reference)

- Countermeasure 18 Enhance diversity of PCV cooling system
- Countermeasure 19 Prevention of the damaging of PCV top-head flange caused by overheating
- Countermeasure 20 Proceed with low pressure injection process reliably
- Countermeasure 21 Improve maneuverability of venting system
- Countermeasure 22 Mitigate the effect of radioactivity caused by venting*
- Countermeasure 23 Ensure independency of vent system
- Countermeasure 24 Prevent the Hydrogen explosion (control the gas concentration and the adequate release)

# Communication, Instrumentation and Control System, and Emergency Response Arrangement (Reference)



- |                          |                                                                          |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Countermeasure 25</i> | <i>Prepare emergency command center</i>                                  |
| Countermeasure 26        | Secure the communication tools for accidents                             |
| <i>Countermeasure 27</i> | <i>Improve reliability of the measurement equipment for accidents</i>    |
| Countermeasure 28        | Enhance the monitoring functions for the plant conditions                |
| Countermeasure 29        | Enhance emergency monitoring functions                                   |
| Countermeasure 30        | Create the structure and conduct the training for the emergency response |

# The total deposition of Cs-134 and Cs-137(as of December 16,2011)





Source: MEXT  
Xxxxx-xx/Footer

The total deposition of Cs-134 and Cs-137 on the ground surface throughout all of East Japan, reflecting the results of the fourth airborne monitoring



National P



# Habitant ratio over 20 mSv in Evacuation zone, *in case of no decontamination*

Municipalities (number to be evacuated)	present	5 years after	10 years after	15 years after
11 city, town, village (total 85,988)	64%	32%	18%	10%
Ookuma (11,515)	100%	97%	81%	44%
Futaba (6,932)	99%	75%	49%	35%
Tomioka (16,001)	96%	34%	1%	0%
Namie (20,905)	66%	24%	10%	8%

“Asahi Shinbun”, June 10,

# ***Radioactive Materials to the Air and the Ocean (TEPCO, as of May 2012)***

<b>PBq to Air</b>	<b>Noble Gas</b>	<b>I-131</b>	<b>Cs-134</b>	<b>Cs-137</b>	<b>Iodine eq.</b>
TEPCO May 2012	About 500	About 500	About 10	About 10	About 900
JAEA March 2012	-	120	-	9	480
NISA Feb 2012	-	150	-	8.2	480
IRSN	2000	200	30		-
Chernobyl	6500	1800	-	85	5200

<b>PBq to Sea</b>		<b>I-131</b>	<b>Cs-134</b>	<b>Cs-137</b>
TEPCO	Mar to Sept	11	3.5	3.6
JAEA	Mar to April	11.4	-	3.6
IRSN	Mar to July	-	-	27

1 PBq(peta Becquerel)=1,000 trillion Bq=10<sup>15</sup> Bq

# ***Fukushima Regional Data*** @ end of 2011

<b>County</b>	<b>SOMA</b>	<b>FUTABA</b>	<b>IWAKI</b>	<b>NAKADO RI</b>	<b>AIZU</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Population of Jan. 2011	122,783	72,679	341,463	1,196,730	290,746	2,024,401
Evacuees inside Fukushima	26,714	51,859	6,596	10,592	8	95,769
Accepted	17,610	52	27,899	42,686	7,522	95,769
Evacuees outside Fukushima						61,659
<b>Death</b>	<b>1,208</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1,915</b>
Missing	12	14	38	1	0	65
Houses lost	6,772	752	7,611	4,556	24	19,715
Half collapse	2,127	197	29,521	29,524	132	61,501

# Accumulated Doses for Fukushima Dai-ichi Plant Personnel

*from March 11 2011 to March 31 2012*

mSv	No. of Tepco people	Associated industry	Total
Over 250	6	0	6
200 – 250	1	2	3
150 – 200	22	2	24
100 – 150	117	17	134
50 – 100	437	364	801
20 – 50	632	2,357	2,989
10 – 20	501	2,811	3,312
Less than 10	1,706	12,047	13,753
Total	3,422	17,600	21,022
Max. mSv	678.80	238.42	
Average mSv	24.68	9.59	12.05

# Overview of Fukushima habitant doses -1

April 26, 2012

- External dose estimation for Namie and Iitate 9,747 people:
  - Less than 1 mSv 57.8%
  - Less than 10 mSv 99.3%
  - Max 23 mSv
- Personal dosimeters
  - Referred data to advisory group from 22 city/town/village, about 70 thousands residents: median less than 1mSv annual
  - Fukushima city (from city home page): median 0.8 mSv annual

# Overview of Fukushima habitant doses -1

April 26, 2012

- External dose estimation for Namie and Iitate 14,412 people: @May 31
  - Less than 5 mSv 94.0 %
  - Less than 10 mSv 99.3 %
  - Max 25.1 mSv
- Personal dosimeters
  - Referred data to advisory group from 22 city/town/village, about 70 thousands residents: median less than 1mSv annual
  - Fukushima city (from city home page): median 0.8 mSv annual

# Overview of Fukushima habitant doses - 2


April 26, 2012

- Internal dose: committed dose less than 1 mSv 22,691 out of 22,717, 99.9%. Max 3 mSv for 2 persons.
- Doses from food:
  - 0.244 mSv at most, assuming selection of contaminated foods
  - 0.01 ~ 0.14 mSv from meals survey by Coop Fukushima
  - About 0.02 mSv estimation by Market Basket Survey (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare)

# Radioactivity survey on real meals of 100 families in Fukushima

Bq/kg

陰膳方式放射能量調査結果 (2012年4月12日 更新)




Bq/kg

Cs-134

Cs-137

Coop Fukushima, updated on April 12, 2012




# *Preliminary personal observations*

- Lack of imagination on beyond design base events both onsite and offsite *a case of Japanese arrogance*
- Collapse of Offsite Center designed to communicate to local and central governments, the plant and others was also out of scope of nuclear disaster prevention planning
- Low dose to habitants with probably minimal or no health effect due to the prompt evacuations by Emergency actions which are still to be reviewed and improved
- Death penalties;
  - Onsite 2 operators drowning by Tsunami at unit #4
  - Suicide ~13 farmers due to stress, desperate for future
  - Lack of care 50~ for olds who were forced to evacuate from the hospitals near the site and wander
  - Radiological 0
- New Standard limits for Radionuclides in Foods became effective in April 2012. Strict ones by orders for the sake of “mother’s anxiety” may hamper restoration of local agriculture, fishery
- Neglect of lessons learnt from Chernobyl which was finished up as issues on Safety Culture

# Off-Site Decontamination Project

- Reduce the size of the areas where exposure is larger than 20 mSv/y ; national government responsibility
- Reduce exposures where it is now under 20 mSv/y by 50% in 2 years
- Where exposures are now 1 mSv/y, concentrate in hot spots
- Huge amounts to be processed/stored/disposed (contaminated soils, incinerator ashes, sewage sludge, rice straw, etc.)
  - 33 million cubic meters, 4.5 trillion yen ; IAE estimates
  - Suffering from NIMBY


# Outline of Off site Decontamination Project



# Public Opinion Survey by Mass Media

What should be the future of nuclear power in Japan?  
(sorted by dates)

■ increase 
 ■ maintain the status quo 
 ■ decrease 
 ■ abolish totally 
 ■ others



# 4. Present Issues

- Re-start up of Ohi 3 & 4 of Kansai EPCo
  - 2.7 GWe PWR deadly needed for base load to peak out in the summer
  - Pre-determined safety reviews done and endorsed, but not-adjacent local governments of Osaka, Kyoto reluctant to accept
  - 50 other NPP waiting for “go” to save fossil fuel charge of about three trillion yen per annum
- Role of Nuclear in Energy Portfolio
  - Erosion of confidence not only in safety but regulation and operators
  - Options of 0 to 25% in 2030 were proposed
  - National debates maybe in the summer time
- Nuclear Fuel Cycle Activities?
  - Rokkasho Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant
  - Monju Prototype Fast Reactor